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Chapter Eight

Thomas Hobbes on the
Aristocracy of Passion
Geoffrey M. Vaughan

Nothing would seem to be further from Hobbes's psychology of man than
the notion of an aristocratic soul. He is widely considered the first of the
bourgeois philosophers.1 As for an aristocratic soul itself—the magnanimous
man of Aristotle, for instance—Hobbes had many reasons to be hostile to this
idea. The very notion of a great man, as someone above the common herd,
presented a danger to his entire political project because that man was moti
vated by pride. A proud man might consider himself immune to danger and
thus not be motivated by the fear of violent death. And without that fear, how
can civil society hold itself together? Curiously, Hobbes did suggest that
there is an aristocratic alternative to fear, namely "a glory or pride in appear
ing not to need to break" one's contract. And so it seems the aristocratic soul
does exist. All that Hobbes could say against it in this context is that it is "too
rarely found to be presumed on." And so what should appear to be a theoreti
cal possibility, the aristocratic soul, turns out to be only a practical problem.
Or so it seems.
This paper will explore the idea of aristocracy in the work of Thomas
Hobbes from both a political and a psychological perspective, for the two are
largely inseparable. I first consider the phenomenon of aristocracy at a gener
al level before turning to Hobbes's thoughts on it. I do this to show that he
had a unique perspective on the problems of aristocracy. I then explore
Michael Oakeshott's suggestion that there can be found an "aristocratic
mood" in Hobbes's work. This is followed by what 1 describe as Hobbes's
replacement of the classical aristocracy of virtue with his own aristocracy of
passion. I conclude with a few thoughts on the cultural benefits of such an
aristocracy and its political dangers.
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THE ARISTOCRATIC APPEAL AND ITS DANGERS
Aristocracy as rule by the best has always been a tempting possibility. Plato's
Socrates claimed that one of the most compelling reasons to rule is that the
wise man would not be ruled by an inferior. But aristocracy also promises
both competent government and an escape from the concerns of governing.
As to the latter, the wisdom of Homer Simpson must be cited on this point. In
one episode he explains to his daughter, "Lisa, the whole reason we have
elected officials is so we don't have to think all the time."2 The Homeric
perspective of this comment is exactly what Rousseau opposed when he
wrote "On the Social Contract." But few really want to be Rousseauian
citizens, flying to the assembly each day. As Pierre Manent has explained,
the political energies of the ancient Greek democracies burnt themselves out
in the Peloponnesian war, as did the French energies in its revolutionary
wars.3 Far better to leave this work to others while we get along with our
lives. The success of the progressive movement in the twentieth century
owes no small part to the same sentiment. Expertise and competence are
virtues in the running of a complex, modern state. While this might run the
risk of confusing meritocracy with aristocracy, the ambiguity is as old as the
treatments of Plato and Aristotle. Socrates described the star-gazing philoso
pher as the best pilot of the ship of state,4 and Aristotle argued that only those
with sufficient leisure could cultivate the virtues necessary for rule. The standard objections to aristocracy are threefold. The first problem is
how to identify the initial group of aristocrats. Who stands out as better than
all the rest? Who can be trusted with such power? One of the fundamental
problems every political society faces, and one that the state of nature theo
rists described so vividly, is that there is no clear way of identifying natural
rulers. Even those outstanding figures whom we might consider to have the
unambiguous qualities of leadership—George Washington and Winston
Churchill come to mind—were not universally considered the natural rulers
they are today. Washington still had to fight the Revolutionary war and
convince the Continental Congress to supply his needs; Churchill was denied
the office he so craved until the last moment. Yet this objection, the problem
of identification, is a practical one. It d oes not deny the existence of aristo
cratic souls who are natural rulers. It simply says it is difficult to find them in
the first instance.
The second objection to aristocracy is also a practical one, yet no less
important. As described in Plato's Republic, regimes degenerate when subse
quent generations do not have the virtues of the founding aristocrats. Even if
we could find natural rulers at the founding of the state, it is not clear that
their progeny will have the same qualities. The wastrel son is cliche from
ancient warrior cultures to modern business. Yet it is not even clear that the
first generation, the aristocrats, want their progeny to follow them. In a
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telling passage in a letter from John Adams to Abigail, one of those founders
of a new order for the ages, he described his hope that their sons would not
be men like himself and would not be engaged in politics, and this even more
the case for successive generations.6 He hoped for a succession of genera
tions that moved further and further away from the concerns that so dominat
ed his life and have made him a figure of fascination and even veneration.
The third standard objection to aristocracy is that it seems incapable of
discovering suitable candidates from outside the official lists. While also a
practical problem, this one is concerned not so much with the quality of rule
is with the fairness or justice, or rather injustice, of excluding those who
should be included within the aristocracy. Again, Plato's Republic is the
classical expression of this concern and also of the unwieldy mechanisms
that would be required to address it. Of course, the modern political world
has come up with its own means of addressing it, namely, through elections.
Although few today would understand how the ancient Greeks were able to
consider elections fundamentally aristocratic, the claim of the candidates and
their supporters is always based on rank, that is, better and worse, the very
language of aristocracy. Ironically, then, modern representative democracy
resolves the problem of aristocracy by re-creating it in a roundabout way.
The epistolary conversation between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson is a
good example of how this is done. Although separated by significant differ
ences on the matter, they both believed that there was a natural aristocracy to
be found among the American people and that the institutions of government
had to be designed in such a way as to find them out. And so the author of the
Declaration of Independence and the author of the Constitution of Massachu
setts late in life supported the American Revolution for its ability to address
this third problem with aristocracy.
HOBBES AGAINST THE ARISTOCRACY
Although Hobbes preferred monarchy above all other forms of government,
there are places in which it is clear that he was open to both aristocracy and
democracy. His preference for monarchy was more practical than theoretical,
it being his concern that the most significant problem in governments is not
that the wrong decision might be made but that a sufficiently large number of
people would argue about any decision. The so-called Ship Money Contro
versy that preceded the English Civil War is a good case in point. According
to the laws of England the crown could impose a special tax throughout the
country for the purpose of outfitting the Navy. Charles I tried to exercise this
right in 1628 and, although the Commons was prorogued, the people ob
jected. In themselves, the objections to the ship money might not have led to
the Civil War. However, Hobbes believed that they did give a pretext for
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other, unstated complaints against the King and, indeed, against monarchy in
general. Whether it was the final straw or a rallying point, it is true that in
politics unlikely events often cause greater ones. On Hobbes's telling, the
English Civil War was caused by people believing they had a right to object
to the decisions of the king. They were strengthened in this belief by the
existence of Parliament, an institution dedicated, it would have seemed to
Hobbes, to frustrating the king. As Michael Walzer put it, "The good aristo
crat indeed consents to the laws he obeys; that is why he obeys them; but he
has at the same time nothing to say about their substance."7
According to Hobbes, almost all political opposition can be traced back to
pride. Civil wars do not arise from people simply having different ideas.
They arise when people think that their ideas about government or policy are
as good as or better than those of the duly appointed rulers. But why should
anybody think that? Pride. His whole science of politics points to the creation
of the great Leviathan, that which will overawe the people and, referring to
the book of Job, will be "king over the children of pride."8 Pride is the great
enemy of the Leviathan because it undercuts the very mechanism of obedi
ence. The Hobbesian state is supposed to work not because the sovereign
always reaches the right conclusion or chooses the best policy. That is too
much to ask of human politics. Rather, the Hobbesian state works when
everyone obeys the sovereign, right or wrong. Indeed, there is no right or
wrong except for what the sovereign says, according to Hobbes.9 To presume
to apply those terms—right and wrong—to anything the sovereign might do
is to place oneself in a position of judgement above the sovereign. And what
is this other than pride?
It is no accident that however much each of his various lists of the laws of
nature might vary, one from another, they always include a law against pride.
This is significant because it r eveals Hobbes's theoretical objections to aris
tocracy as opposed to the practical objections considered earlier. Recall, the
three objections revolve around finding an initial group of aristocrats, sus
taining their qualities through subsequent generations, and including qual
ified people from outside the initial list. Nowhere did Hobbes deny that these
are problems. He was as aware of them is anyone. Instead, he would suggest
that these three problems arise precisely because of pride. They are practical
problems only because of this underlying theoretical or psychological prob
lem. Everyone values himself higher than he does his fellows.10 Therefore,
everyone wants to be counted among the aristocrats or, if not everyone, far
too many to fit within their ranks.11 And this is not an unreasonable ambition.
Not only are the rewards of being an aristocrat far greater than those of being
an average citizen, Hobbes told us that the distinctions of rank are arbitrary:
"The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of meer
Nature; where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. The inequallity that now is, has bin introduced by the Lawes civill."12 If it is arbitrary
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who will be the lord of the manor or the serf,13 then what rational person
would not want to be at the top?14 And so the vanity or pride that creates the
initial problem becomes contagious. Even people who might not have started
with it soon acquire it.15
Having lived in two countries characterized by the pathology of pride,
Hobbes could see that any civil society that relies upon this is inherently
unstable. As he wrote in De Cive, "no large or lasting society can be based
upon the passion for glory. The reason is that glorying, like honour, is noth
ing if everybody has it, since it c onsists in comparison and preeminence."16
Any society based upon a zero-sum game is setting up conflict. According to
Julie Cooper, "By Hobbes's admission, laws of honor may frustrate the end
for which they were established—namely, peace—for they are liable to exac
erbate, rather than redirect, the passion of vainglory."17 Moreover, such hier
archies can never be entirely rigid for they must always, and do always,
permit new members to enter. Where the rewards for entry are so great, as I
have stated, there are countless political and psychological incentives for
each individual to rise into the ranks of the aristocracy. Aristocracy is noth
ing but a problem.
There seems to be one exception to this problem of aristocracy, as many
commentators have pointed out, namely Sidney Godolphin. Godolphin died
early in the Civil Wars fighting for the Royalist cause and Hobbes dedicated
Leviathan to his brother, Francis. The character of Sidney enters into a dis
cussion of aristocracy because Hobbes praised him in both the Epistle Dedi
catory and the Review and Conclusion to Leviathan. Accordingly, Hobbes
wrote, "For there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the service
of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society, or private Friend
ship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation, not as acquired by
necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous
constitution of his nature."18 In the last few pages of his great book, Hobbes
used the example of his late friend as evidence that there is "no such Incon
sistence of Humane Nature, with Civill Duties, as some think."19 Did Sidney
Godolphin allow Hobbes to square the circle of aristocracy as he would
shortly claim but fail to do in geometry?20
Godolphin—either one, but especially Sidney—was a very unusual de
dicatee for Hobbes. As Richard Tuck points out, Hobbes was trying to ac
commodate himself to the new powers in England in his "Review and Con
clusion."21 Choosing to dedicate the book to a prominent Royalist would
seem to be a mistake. Clarendon noted this and concluded that Hobbes chose
to dedicate the book in order to secure the £200 bequest from Sidney that
Francis had not yet paid. John T. Scott has given the question of Hobbes's
relationship to Godolphin sustained attention, framing it in terms of friend
ship rather than aristocracy. Nevertheless, his work is significant for drawing
attention to the fact that Hobbes praised his late friend for the "quite un-
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Hobbesian virtues of courage and friendship."22 Scott's conclusion is that,
"Godolphin's loyalty to the king and his friendship for Hobbes seem to
transcend the vision of human nature Hobbes offers in his work. 23 While I
am inclined to agree with Scott about Hobbes's vision of human nature, and 1
do not doubt their friendship, I a m not convinced that Godolphin rises to the
level of an aristocratic soul. Hobbes's description of the man is sufficiently
bourgeois to prevent that. What he was, significantly, was a poet. I shall
return to this below.
HOBBES AND THE FEW
Michael Oakeshott has argued that Thomas Hobbes had, even if he did not
fully develop it, an aristocratic mood in his argument. He described it as an
idiom of morality that was appropriate to creatures "more properly concerned
with honour than with either survival or prosperity."24 Oakeshott's argument,
which he admitted was speculative, would put Hobbes in a line of thought
shared with Spinoza and Hume wherein pride or self-esteem is enough to
bring men to heel.25 He based his argument upon a few scattered but very
important passages in Leviathan. The first concerns Hobbes s explanation for
why men might perform their covenants: "either a Feare of the consequence
of breaking their word; or a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to break
it."26 In the subsequent chapter Hobbes explained, "That which gives to
humane Actions their relish of Justice, is a certain Noblenesse or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found,) by which a man scorns to be beholding for
the contentment of his life, to fraud, or breach of promise."27 The last of the
three comments, coming from chapter 27 of Leviathan, has Hobbes arguing
that above all other passions fear is the one that prevents men from commit
ting crimes, "accepting some generous natures."28 Who are these generous
natures? They certainly seem to be the same ones who would perform their
contracts because of glory or pride and thereby attain that nobleness or gallantness of courage. If there is such thing as an aristocratic soul in the philos
ophy of Thomas Hobbes it is to be found in these passages.
According to Oakeshott, and I c ertainly agree with him on this, Hobbes's
problem is that there are not enough of these aristocratic souls to form a
stable Commonwealth. Certainly, if enough men were so concerned with
their honor that they would never break their covenants, everyone else could
perform theirs without fear of the consequences of nonperformance on the
part of the other. He addressed exactly this possibility:
For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation
of Justice, and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them
all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then
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there neither would be, nor need to be any Civill Government, or Common
wealth at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.29

James Madison would later make the same argument, if more poetically, in
Federalist 51: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on govern
ment would be necessary." Unfortunately, and in Hobbes own words, "this
later is a Generosity to rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the
pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest
part of Mankind."30 Where I cannot follow Oakeshott is his next step, in
which he attempts to explain this most recent passage from Hobbes in the
following way: "In short, Hobbes perceived that men lack passion rather than
reason, and lack, above all, this passion."31 This goes too far. I must, instead,
agree with Gabriella Slomp that, "in all his political writings Hobbes regards
desire of glory either as the only or at least as one of the chief destabilizing
forces in human interactions."32
On the one hand, readers of Hobbes could agree that were pride instead of
fear the passion that could most easily be relied upon to enforce contracts,
Hobbes would have used that in his argument. And yet, as even Oakeshott
must admit, he did not do so. Hobbes consistently advocated the use of fear
to motivate the enforcement of covenants rather than pride.33 Yes, there does
seem to be some small indication, or perhaps an indication of some small
number, of aristocratic souls—and we owe a debt to Oakeshott for drawing
this to our attention. It does not follow, however, that the smallness of their
number is the only problem in appealing to their pride. Oakeshott's presenta
tion of these proud and gallant men who would keep their covenants as a
matter of honor, while very much in line with Hobbes's own presentation of
them in the three passages cited, is lifeless. Pride here is an easy-going selfconfidence. It is more akin to self-esteem as we might use it now.34 Never
theless, Oakeshott seems to have confused the state of nature and the state of
seminar, not unlike Rawls would do later. The children of this kind of pride
would never need a king over them for they would be able to govern them
selves.
Despite my disagreement with Oakeshott's analysis, he points to a very
important and perhaps new understanding of aristocracy. When I addressed
the issue above and in terms of the classical tradition, aristocrats deserve the
title of "the best" from their virtues, whether moral or intellectual. What
Oakeshott draws to our attention, instead, is an aristocracy of passion. That
is, cognitive and moral superiority is not an issue; rather, passion or the
balance of various passions one against the other makes aristocrats. Again,
while I do not agree with Oakeshott's suggestion that pride is a better enforc
er of contracts than fear, or even to imagine such a thing within Hobbes's
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philosophy, I do think the aristocracy of passion is an important way to
understand how Hobbes might have conceived of an aristocratic soul.
THE ARISTOCRACY OF PASSION
It is generally accepted, and rightly so, that the concept of a soul is incompat
ible with Hobbes's materialist, mechanistic philosophy. He famously dis
missed the notion that the human soul is an incorporeal body with the sug
gestion that it is really a "thin aereall" body.35 At several points in Leviathan
he argued that every reference to the soul in Scripture was merely a reference
to life, the activity or presence of life, rather than to any particular or separate
thing in itself.36 The only place in his work where the soul meant anything
real was when he used it as an analogy for the sovereign in the state. In his
extended analogy in the Introduction to Leviathan he wrote that"Soveraignty
is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body."37 But
there is no such thing, as far as I can find in his work, as a natural soul.
Instead, in place of a unified soul animating the human being, Hobbes argued
that the passions fill this role.
In chapter 6 of Leviathan, "Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Mo
tions; commonly called the Passions. And the Speeches by which they are
expressed," Hobbes took what were for him curiously tentative steps towards
the conclusion that all interior motions begin with the passions. First, he
stated that "the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary
Motion."38 Then he explained that the small beginnings of motion within the
human person are called endeavor. Endeavor is divided into the positive
(appetite or desire), or the negative (aversion).39 These are further subdi
vided. Only later in the chapter are they clearly identified as passions. He
wrote, "These simple Passions called Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate,
Joy, and Griefe, have their names for diverse conditions diversified."40 The
significance of the passions for our topic of aristocracy and the aristocratic
soul can be found in chapter 8 of Leviathan.
According to Hobbes, natural intelligence consists of two parts, namely,
"Celerity of Imagining," and "steddy direction to some approved end."41
This echoes a parallel passage from the Elements of Law, in which he wrote,
"The difference therefore of wits hath its original from the different passions,
and from the ends to which their appetite leadeth them."42 Any distinction
we might ascribe to an aristocratic soul, such as superior virtue or intelli
gence, are to be found in the peculiar object or vehemence of the individual's
passions. More precisely, "The Passions that most of all cause the differences
of Wit, principally, the more or less Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowl
edge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of
Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but several sorts of Power."43
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The continuation of this line of thought in the next paragraph is especially
instructive. Hobbes continued, "And therefore, a man who has no great Pas
sion for any of these things; but is as men terme it indifferent; though he may
be so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offense; yet he cannot
possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgment." If there is ever to be
found an aristocratic mood in Hobbes's philosophy, as Oakeshott put it, it is
here. Not only did Hobbes identify greatness with great passion, he identified
mediocrity with indifference. One would expect Hobbes to have preferred
the passionless, inoffensive, little man who is likely to obey all laws. He did
not, and that is telling.
Telling too, however, is the fact that Hobbes did not seek to found his
new politics on the passionate man he seemed to admire. And this is not
simply because there were too few of them. Even a society entirely consist
ing of these aristocratic passions would not serve Hobbes's purpose. The
problem is the variability of their object as well as the intensity of the pas
sions. Recall from above, the aristocratic passions he identified are all in
volved in the quest for power, power in its various forms. Individuals with
strong passions therefore feel more strongly that "perpetuall and restlesse
desire of Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death."44 This is why
Hobbes only seems to be caught in a bind in Leviathan where he attributes to
vainglorious men both ostentatious inaction and "rash engaging."45 He is not
caught in a bind because vainglory can lead to both. This has nothing to do
with his rhetorical exaggeration that vainglory is a form of madness.46 Rath
er, in human society power can be achieved through bluffing, which he
describes as ostentation without attempt. At other times rashness will pay off.
As in all things in Hobbes's world, this is a calculation the individual must
make. The timorous man will venture very little, the passionate man quite a
bit more, perhaps more than he ought. The problem for Hobbes is that so
long as men must make this calculation it will be made entirely on the basis
of the idiosyncratic intensity of their passions. There is no way to predict or
guarantee what men will do. This is why he must rely upon fear.
HOBBES'S ARISTOCRATIC SOUL
There is a place for the aristocratic soul in Hobbes's philosophical work. It is,
course, a very different place from the classical conception because his is an
aristocracy of passion rather than virtue. The passionate man is neither a
cool, collected Stoic nor an Epicurean with four aces. Yet neither is he an
erotic soul on the model of Plato's philosopher. The man of great passion that
Hobbes found so much more interesting than the "indifferent" man was
interesting precisely because he had more "wit." These were the ones with a
greater desire for power, riches, knowledge, and honor. But in the new aris-
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tocracy the objects of their passion are no longer, or should no longer be,
political. As Leo Strauss observed, "At the end of this process there is,
however, not only the establishment of a peculiarly bourgeois morality, but
at the same time aristocratic virtue itself becomes sublimated and spiritual
ized."47
A good example of the new type of aristocrat may be Hobbes's one-time
employer, Francis Bacon. According to Hobbes, Bacon died as a result of a
rash experiment in food preservation. The story is preserved by John Aubrey
as follows:
Mr. Hobbs told me that the cause of his lordship's death was trying an experi
ment: viz., as he was taking the aire in a coach with Dr. Witherborne (a
Scotchman, Physitian to the King) towards High-gate, snow lay on the ground,
and it came into my lord's thoughts, why flesh might not be preserved in snow,
as in salt. They were resolved they would try the experiment presently. They
alighted out of the coach, and went into a poore woman's howse at the bottome
of Highgate hill, and bought a hen, and made the woman exenterate it, and
then stuffed the bodie with snow, and my lord did help to doe it himselfe. The
snow so chilled him, that he immediately fell so extremely ill, that he could not
returne to his lodgings (I suppose then at Grave's Inne), but went to the earle
of Arundell's house at High-gate, where they putt him into a good bed warmed
with a panne, but it was a damp bed that had not been layn-in in about a yeare
before, which gave him such a cold that in 2 or 3 dayeS; as I remember he told
me, he dyed of suffocation.48

Scholars have suggested a number of problems with this story. For one, this
carriage ride was supposed to have taken place in April, when there is little
snow. Additionally, he seems to have been ill months earlier. Jardine and
Stewart also suggest that Bacon was experimenting on ways to preserve his
own life, not poultry, when he died. His correspondence lends some credence
to this conclusion, which makes Hobbes's revision even more interesting.49
Whatever may be the exact details of Bacon's death, we should be more
concerned that Hobbes wanted this story recorded by Aubrey. What does it
tell us? It tells us of a man so driven to experiment that he lost his life. As
such, it may be the first romantic account of the scientist in modern literature.
In Hobbes's account of Bacon's death the romance of science is more
broadly a romance of passion. The passionate artist of word, sound, or paint
has become a commonplace. For example, George Orwell listed "sheer ego
ism" as the first of his four reasons in "Why I Write." In that same essay he
described a writer as "a person whose most absorbed and passionate hours
are spent arranging words on pieces of paper." Beethoven may provide an
even more compelling example. Consider the following from his diaries,
"Live alone in your art! Restricted though you be by your defective sense,
this is still the only existence for you."50 Earlier, his passion for music was
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all that kept him alive, "Such experiences brought me to the verge of de
spair—but little more and I s hould have put an end to my life. Art, art alone
deterred me."51 The image of the deaf Beethoven agonizing over composing
music he could never hear is better explained by Hobbes than by Aristotle.
Our cultural life is immeasurably richer because of these aristocrats of pas
sion. The irony is that our politics may be much worse, a fate Hobbes would
have deplored.
We live in a world characterized by passion. Passionate leaders are
sought, pursuing one's passion is considered the height of human fulfillment,
and political education has become a matter of affect and emotion rather than
duty or right. According to Alexis de Tocqueville, "... for equality they
have an ardent, insatiable, eternal, invincible passion; they want equality in
freedom, and, if they cannot get it, they still want it in slavery."52 Hobbes's
conception has triumphed and we are in many ways the beneficiaries of
aristocrats of passion, especially in the sciences and the arts, that is, outside
of politics. Unfortunately, the passionate campaigner for one cause or an
other has become a cliche because passion has become a substitute for virtue.
And while some campaigns are far better than others, passion is measured
more in its intensity than in its object. As a result, the most passionate
politics from the French to the Cultural Revolution have not produced the
peaceful societies Hobbes sought. We must remember, of course, that he did
not want the politics of aristocratic passion. He wanted the politics of fear.
But his work contained within it a view of nobility, an understanding of the
aristocratic soul that would unleash wars beyond his imagining.
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